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The prospects for Croatia’s co-operation with the Visegrad Group
Andrzej Sadecki 
The Visegrad Group gained a new neighbour in the European Union on 1 July 2013. Given the 
geographic proximity, similar level of development and a number of shared interests, Croatia 
could become a valuable partner in Central European regional co-operation. Co-operation in 
the “V4+” format is possible in most of the Visegrad Group’s priorities, primarily in: energy se-
curity, transport, neighbourhood policy and EU enlargement. V4 could be attractive for Croatia 
as a grouping which forms broader coalitions within the EU and is helpful in solving regional 
problems. However, making use of this potential in practice will depend on the determination 
to enhance co-operation, and its success may be thwarted by temporary bilateral issues.
Croatia’s key partners in the EU
Croatia has strong economic and political con-
nections with a few EU member states, which 
could become important partners in Zagreb’s 
European policy. Croatia has traditionally kept 
very close relations with Germany. Germany is 
its second largest trade partner, and Germans 
are the most numerous group of tourists visiting 
Croatia. Croatia has especially strong bonds with 
two southern federal states, Baden-Württem-
berg and Bavaria, which are home to most of 
the Croatian diaspora in Germany (over 200,000 
people). Germany was the advocate of Croatia’s 
independence and was one of the first countries 
to recognise Croatia as a sovereign state. How-
ever, it was the last EU member state to ratify 
the accession treaty with Croatia and expressed 
dissatisfaction with the manner in which Croatia 
was implementing the regulations concerning 
the European Arrest Warrant. Germany is also 
increasingly sceptical about further EU enlarge-
ment, and this is contrary to Croatia’s interests. 
Italy is Croatia’s largest trade partner and a ma-
jor investor, especially in the banking sector. 
It also has historic and cultural bonds with Cro-
atia, in particular with its coastal regions: Dal-
matia and Istria. Croatia shares some common 
history with Austria too, which is the largest in-
vestor in Croatia. From among Croatia’s neigh-
bours within the EU, Slovenia is the country it 
has most in common with in terms of history 
and culture. However, Croatian-Slovenian rela-
tions became complicated over the past years 
due to disputes linked to their Yugoslavian leg-
acy. Nevertheless, immediately before Croatia’s 
accession, the two countries agreed on the way 
the contentious issues would be handled (e.g. 
the maritime boundary delimitation issue will 
be submitted to arbitration), and bilateral rela-
tions improved. The heads of state of Austria, 
Slovenia and Croatia met in August 2013 in Graz 
and promised to enhance their co-operation and 
hold regular trilateral meetings. 
Out of all the Visegrad countries, Croatia has the 
closest relations with its neighbour, Hungary. For 
centuries, the kingdoms of Croatia and Hungary 
were connected through a personal union. The 
Balkan direction has traditionally been a priori-
ty in Hungary’s foreign policy. Hungary backed 
Croatia’s independence and clearly supported it 
in its efforts to join the EU. Even prior to Cro-
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atia’s accession, the two countries co-operated 
for example in the Quadrilaterale format (with 
Italy and Slovenia also participating). Accession 
negotiations with Croatia were finalised at the 
time of Hungary’s presidency of the Council of 
the European Union. Their bilateral relations are 
not burdened with ethnic minority issues, which 
sometimes cause tension in Hungary’s relations 
with its neighbours (Romania, Serbia, Slovakia 
and Ukraine). The Hungarian minority in Croa-
tia is small and has extensive rights, as with the 
Croatian minority in Hungary1. 
Although both parties are emphasising that 
their bilateral relations are exemplary, they are 
still not free from disputes. These disputes are 
primarily linked to the presence of Hungary’s 
MOL company on the Croatian energy market. 
In 2009, it increased its stake in Croatia’s strate-
gic energy company, INA, to almost 50%, thus 
taking over control of the company’s manage-
ment2. Although INA’s financial results have 
improved significantly since then, the Croatian 
government, which holds a 45% stake, has res-
ervations about the company’s management 
policy (for example, it is questioning what it 
sees as insufficient investment and the plan to 
close the Sisak refinery). The manner in which 
MOL took over control of the company has also 
given rise to controversy. In November 2012, 
a court of the first instance sentenced Ivo Sanader 
(Croatia’s prime minister in 2003-2009) to 
10 years in prison  for accepting a bribe from rep-
resentatives of the Hungarian company. Croatian 
prosecution authorities have been insisting since 
2011 that the CEO of MOL, Zsolt Hernadi, be 
heard in court as a suspect. Hungarian prosecu-
tion authorities have refused to detain the CEO 
of Hungary’s largest company, who is also an in-
fluential person in Hungary, arguing that in their 
refusal they are guided by ‘national interests’. The 
Hungarian government has distanced itself from 
1 According to the 2011 censuses, 14,000 ethnic Hungari-
ans live in Croatia (0.33% of the population) and 24,000 
ethnic Croatians live in Hungary (0.24%). 
2 MOL held 25% plus one shares in the company from 2003.
this case, indicating that the state owned just 
a minority stake in MOL. However, after a court 
in Zagreb issued an arrest warrant concerning 
Hernadi on 27 September 2013, the Hungarian 
government cancelled the visit of the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Janos Martonyi, to Croatia 
and called upon MOL’s management to inves-
tigate the possibilities of selling its stake in the 
Croatian company. This issue will make it diffi-
cult to reach a compromise in the negotiations 
which commenced on 18 September over the 
manner of INA management between the Cro-
atian government and MOL. It will also adverse-
ly affect relations between the two countries. 
Croatia is also in co-operation with other EU 
member states as part of macro-regional initia-
tives. It is one of the countries covered directly 
by the European Union Strategy for the Danube 
Region (EUSDR), which includes all V4 states 
except for Poland. It also joined the Adriatic 
and Ionian Initiative (together with Italy, Slove-
nia, Greece, Albania, Montenegro, Serbia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina). These countries sent 
a request to the European Commission to pre-
pare an EU strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian 
region by 2014 that would resemble the EUSDR 
and the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region 
(EUSBSR). These strategies could potentially 
form a platform for enhancing co-operation 
between EU member states and contribute to 
closer collaboration in the decision-making pro-
cess within the EU. As part of the EU’s European 
Territorial Co-operation, Croatia participates in 
two trans-national co-operation programmes: 
the Mediterranean programme and the South-
Out of all the Visegrad countries, Croatia 
has the closest relations with its neigh-
bour, Hungary. However, these relations 
are not free of disputes, which are primar-
ily linked to the presence of MOL compa-
ny on the Croatian energy market.
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East Europe programme, where it collaborates, 
for example, with Hungary and Slovakia. In 
turn, it does not participate in the Central Eu-
rope programme (which covers all the V4 states 
among others). Croatia and its partners from 
the Visegrad Group are also members of the 
Central European Initiative, but as regards es-
tablishing closer co-operation between this 
region and the EU, this broad structure is not 
currently playing any major role. 
Visegrad Group’s co-operation 
with Croatia
Croatians are emphasising that upon accession 
their country symbolically left the Western Bal-
kan region. Due to historical bonds, the Central 
European is often counterposed to the Balkan 
in Croatian political thought (the concept of 
‘the escape from the Balkans’). However, from 
Croatia’s point of view, the bonds with Central 
Europe also include bonds with Austria, Slo-
venia and northern Italy, and the intensity of 
co-operation with the V4 states is far behind 
Croatia’s links with these EU member states. 
Croatian foreign policy has for years been fo-
cused on the accession process and resolving 
bilateral issues, related to the legacy of the col-
lapse of Yugoslavia. Croatia’s accession to NATO 
(2009) and the EU has entailed the need to op-
timise the formula for implementing its nation-
al interests within the new political framework. 
In this process, the bonds with Central Europe, 
including the Visegrad Group states, may be-
come increasingly important. The indications 
that Croatia is interested not only in enhancing 
political co-operation but also in acting togeth-
er in particular sectors, which is part of co-op-
eration within the V4, are promising signs. The 
cooperation could also be developed together 
with partners from Central Europe in the broad 
meaning of the term in the larger V4+ format. 
The Visegrad Group has over the past few years 
been increasingly more engaged in former Yu-
goslavia. This has traditionally been an import-
ant direction in foreign policy for the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. In the previous 
decade, the V4 states were engaged in multi-
lateral co-operation with the countries classified 
as Western Balkan, mainly within the Regional 
Partnership format together with Austria and 
Slovenia, for example, by sharing their com-
mon experiences of the EU integration process. 
At present, the most important platform for 
regional co-operation with Austria and Slove-
nia for all the V4 states is the Salzburg Forum, 
which is a formula for the co-operation of inte-
rior ministries. Bulgaria and Romania joined it in 
2006 to be followed subsequently by Croatia in 
2012. Over time, Croatia and its partners from 
the Western Balkans, like the countries from 
the EU’s eastern neighbourhood, have become 
a priority area for the Visegrad Group itself. 
The stimulus for establishing closer co-oper-
ation with Croatia came with the gas crisis in 
2009, when Central and South-Eastern Europe-
an countries had to face cuts in gas supplies as 
a consequence of the Russian-Ukrainian dispute. 
Croatia joined the consultations concerning re-
gional energy security, which were initiated by 
the Visegrad Group. Since the Hungarian pres-
idency of the V4 in 2009/2010, representatives 
of Croatia have participated in a number of 
Visegrad Group meetings (they usually joined 
the V4+Slovenia format) covering such issues 
as transport, regional development, justice and 
public administration. Other areas of co-opera-
tion appeared after the conclusion of the acces-
sion negotiations in 2011.
During the negotiations regarding the EU’s Mul-
tiannual Financial Framework for 2014-2020, 
The indications that Croatia is interested 
not only in enhancing political co-opera-
tion but also in acting together in particu-
lar sectors, which is part of co-operation 
within the V4, are promising signs.
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Croatia joined the so-called Friends of Cohe-
sion Policy group, which was co-formed by the 
Visegrad ‘four’. It should be expected that Cro-
atia, being a beneficiary of EU funds, will sup-
port a strong cohesion policy in the future, as 
do the V4 countries. Croatia and the Visegrad 
Group have common interests in all those areas 
where the ‘four’ co-operate especially closely, 
namely: energy security, transport corridors, 
neighbourhood policy and EU enlargement 
policy. The will to enhance co-operation was 
expressed in the common declaration by the 
ministers of foreign affairs of the V4 and Croa-
tia, adopted shortly before Croatia’s accession 
to the EU3. The agenda of the Hungarian presi-
dency of the Visegrad Group4 also provides for 
a general perspective for developing co-opera-
tion within the V4+Croatia format. 
Energy issues 
Croatia participates in the Visegrad Group’s 
flagship project, namely the creation of the 
North-South gas corridor. Zagreb also desires 
the creation of a common energy market and 
development of transport infrastructure. In No-
vember 2011, Croatia and other countries from 
the region joined the V4 initiative and signed 
a memorandum of understanding with the Eu-
ropean Commission envisaging the construc-
tion of North-South system interconnectors. In 
September 2012, the Polish and Croatian trans-
mission system operators, Gaz System and Plin-
acro, signed a letter of intent to create a gas 
corridor between the Baltic Sea and the Adri-
atic Sea5. The first interconnector (with a rela-
tively large capacity of 6.5 bcm) as part of the 
3 Joint Declaration of the Foreign Ministers of the Visegrad 
Countries and Croatia on the Occasion of the Croatian 
Accession to the EU (26 June 2013), http://www.viseg-
radgroup.eu/calendar/2013/joint-declaration-of-the
4 Hungarian Presidency in the Visegrad Group (2013–
2014), http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/presi-
dency-programs/20132014-hungarian  
5 Declaration on Gaz-System S.A.’s co-operation with the 
Croatian transmission system operator, Plinacro D.O.O. 
(13 September 2012), http://www.gaz-system.pl/cen-
trum-prasowe/aktualnosci/informacja/artykul/201544/
gas corridor was put into operation in 2011 and 
connected the systems of Croatia and Hungary. 
It is barely used but its significance could grow 
once a Croatian LNG terminal is launched or an 
attractive offer price appears in the north.
Although the launch of the Croatian LNG termi-
nal has been planned for more than a decade, 
it is still unclear whether it will be built. The 
Adria LNG consortium6 suspended the prepa-
ratory work for the construction of the Omisalj 
terminal on Krk island in 2010 as a consequence 
of the economic crisis and falling gas consump-
tion in Europe. The Croatian government is 
calculating that the state-owned companies, 
Plinacro and HEP, could build a smaller gas ter-
minal which would have a yearly capacity of 
5 bcm and not 15 bcm as originally planned. 
The feasibility study is to be presented by the 
end of 2013. The Hungarian government is also 
considering whether the state-owned energy 
company, MVM, could join this investment. 
However, Croatia is engaged in a number of 
competitive projects, which could postpone or 
even thwart the plans to build the LNG termi-
nal. In January 2013, it signed an agreement 
with Gazprom under which a branch of the 
South Stream  gas pipeline (with a 2.7 bcm ca-
pacity) running to Croatia will be built. Croatia 
also participates in the Ionian Adriatic Pipeline 
(IAP)7 project, which is to be connected to the 
planned Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) that in late 
June 2013 won the competition with the Nab-
ucco consortium for supplying natural gas from 
6 Its shareholders are E.On Ruhrgas (39.17%), OMV 
(32.47%), Total (27.36%) and Geoplin (1%).
7 Joint Statement of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Alba-
nia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Italy and 
Montenegro. Dubrovnik, June 12, 2013, http://www.
mvep.hr/files/file/2013/130613-jointstatement.pdf
Croatia participates in the Visegrad 
Group’s flagship project, namely the crea-
tion of the North-South gas corridor.
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the Azerbaijani Shah Deniz II field to Europe. 
Given the low level of domestic gas consump-
tion in Croatia (2.8 bcm in 2012), the construc-
tion of an LNG terminal may prove groundless 
once all these projects have been implement-
ed. On the other hand, if the IAP gas pipeline is 
built, Croatia (set to dispose of half of its 5 bcm 
capacity) will be able to export some Azerbaija-
ni gas, for example, to Hungary. 
Croatia is also potentially an essential oil transit 
country via which supplies could be made to Hun-
gary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. If supplies 
to Central Europe via the southern branch of the 
Druzhba pipeline were to be reduced significant-
ly, the Adria pipeline will gain significance. This 
pipeline transports gas from the Omisalj port in 
Croatia to the refinery in Budapest and will also 
transport it to Bratislava and possibly to refiner-
ies in the Czech Republic in the future, once the 
planned modernisation of the section connecting 
Adria and Druzhba is finalised. This is one of the 
reasons why Russian companies are interested in 
entering Croatia (including INA), which has been 
evident for a few years now. 
Croatia also shares the Visegrad Group’s stance 
on the use of nuclear energy. It wants this sec-
tor to be developed because of the possibility of 
ensuring competitive energy prices and low car-
bon emissions (Croatia’s state-owned company 
HEP co-owns the Krsko nuclear power plant 
in Slovenia). Given the fact that its industry is 
relatively energy-intensive, Croatia may also be 
a valuable partner for the Visegrad Group as 
regards energy and climate policy issues. 
Transport 
Another potential area for closer co-operation 
between Croatia and the Visegrad Group is 
transport infrastructure and its development 
along the North-South axis. Croatia is attrac-
tive to the V4 countries because of its access to 
the Mediterranean Sea (transport of goods and 
tourism). The Croatian government is planning 
to make Rijeka an important Adriatic Sea port 
again; the role this port was forced to relinquish 
to Slovenia’s Koper and Italy’s Trieste as a conse-
quence of the Balkan Wars in the 1990s. Croatia 
has a well-developed network of road connec-
tions, and is planning to develop and modernise 
the railroad infrastructure, seaports, river ports 
and airports in the near future. However, the im-
plementation of these investments will depend 
on the availability of external funding. 
As regards railway connections, the most im-
portant investment will be the construction 
and modernisation of the railway line as part 
of the Vb – Rijeka Port – Karlovac – Zagreb – 
Koprivnica (border with Hungary) corridor. The 
connection between Rijeka and Budapest is to 
be modernised by 2020 (investments worth 
2 billion euros, financed predominantly with EU 
funds). Plans include developing the container 
terminal in Rijeka and terminal construction 
on Krk island. Rijeka’s connection with Central 
Europe also fits in with the Central European 
Transport Corridor (CETC-Route 65) concept, 
which connects Sweden via the Świnoujście 
– Szczecin ports through the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Hungary and Croatia to the Adriatic 
(Croatia’s five regions are partner regions). Cro-
atia is also interested in access to the intermod-
al corridor running from the Gdańsk/Gdynia/
Sopot Tricity to the Adriatic Sea8. Zagreb would 
also favourably regard the development of the 
Vc – Hungary – Croatia – Bosnia and Herze-
govina – Croatia – (Ploce Port) transport corri-
8 The container terminals in Gdynia (BCT) and Rijeka (Adri-
atic Gate) are owned by one firm, ICTSI from the Philip-
pines. 
A number of issues to which the Visegrad 
Group attaches high priority (the energy 
sector, cohesion, transport, EU enlarge-
ment and the Neighbourhood Policy) will 
also be the areas where the co-operation 
with Croatia could be enhanced.
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dor. The implementation of this corridor would 
improve connections between the eastern and 
southern parts of the country via Bosnia and Her-
zegovina (BiH) and strengthen the role of Croatia’s 
Ploce port, which predominantly handles custom-
ers from BiH. This would enable the development 
of underinvested regions of Croatia and BiH, and 
establish a better connection between Dalmatia 
and Central Europe. 
Eastern Partnership  
and Western Balkans
Like the V4 countries, Croatia is a staunch sup-
porter of continuing the process of EU enlarge-
ment, and will strive to ensure stabilisation in 
those countries which are neighbours of the 
EU. Given its location, Croatia is interested pri-
marily in the accession of its Balkan neighbours: 
Montenegro, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina. It should be expected that Croatia will be 
actively engaged in the efforts to ensure that 
these countries join the EU as soon as possible. 
However, it will also be tempted to use the ac-
cession negotiations to force its neighbours to 
make concessions to it in bilateral disputes. This 
tactic was employed by Slovenia, which sus-
pended progress in the EU–Croatia negotiations 
for almost a year. Croatian diplomats have de-
clared on numerous occasions that their coun-
try does not intend to obstruct the accession of 
Serbia or any other state from this region. Cro-
atia’s co-operation with the Visegrad Group on 
the one hand would enrich V4 engagement for 
the Western Balkans with Zagreb’s precious ex-
perience and, at the same time, would motivate 
Croatia to be constructively engaged in backing 
reforms in those Balkan countries which aspire 
to join the EU, and also to continuing the pro-
cess of reconciliation with its neighbours. 
Croatia has no major interests in the EU’s East-
ern Neighbourhood (the countries covered by 
the Eastern Partnership). Being the European 
Union’s new frontier state which has joined 
the group of countries supporting enlargement 
and strives to tighten co-operation with the 
V4, it can significantly strengthen the group of 
countries that want the EU to continue its en-
gagement in the Eastern Neighbourhood. Since 
Croatia is a Mediterranean country, it is likely to 
be interested in the southern dimension of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy. However, this 
does not mean that it will turn its back on Cen-
tral Europe’s priorities, especially given the fact 
that Croatia has no well-developed links with 
North African or Middle Eastern countries. 
Conclusions
The V4 states supported Croatia during the pro-
cess of accession negotiations, which were final-
ised during Hungary’s presidency of the Council 
of the EU in the first half of 2011. The accession 
treaty was signed under the Polish presidency 
in December 2011. Both the achievement of 
co-operation (multilateral and bilateral alike) 
and the community of interests in many areas 
form essential political capital for establishing 
stronger bonds between the V4 and Croatia. 
However, it should not be forgotten that the 
V4’s priorities in these areas do not necessarily 
match the interests of Croatia’s vital partners 
in the EU, which may reduce Zagreb’s determi-
nation in the joint effort to carve out a com-
mon Central European stance. It is not always 
in the interest of the V4’s Western neighbours 
to attach high priority to infrastructural con-
nections running along the North-South axis. 
Last but not least, the logic for development 
of this ‘axis’ also includes elements of competi-
tion, such as rivalry among the Mediterranean 
seaports and also between the Mediterranean 
and Baltic seaports, as well as possible parallel 
functioning of the Baltic and Adriatic LNG ter-
minals. However, the countries should not be 
discouraged from co-operation due to this, and 
instead they should be prompted to use the 
multilateral co-operation instruments to align 
their interests and build synergistic solutions, 
since the idea of building stronger bonds be-
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tween Croatia and the V4 is in the long-term 
interest of the region and the EU as a whole. 
The V4 countries agree that the present shape of 
the Group needs to be maintained, however the 
V4+ format offers a good platform for coopera-
tion with third parties. This format provides for 
meetings of representatives of the V4 and other 
states at various levels, depending on the issues 
on the agenda. This in particular concerns co-op-
eration with those partners from the EU which 
are situated in the neighbourhood of the V4 
states: Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia and the Baltic 
states. A number of issues to which the Viseg-
rad Group attaches high priority (the energy 
sector, cohesion, transport, EU enlargement and 
the Neighbourhood Policy) will also be the areas 
where co-operation with Croatia could be en-
hanced. Given the strong territorial aspect in the 
sectoral policies which the V4 and Croatia share, 
it would be advisable to include Croatia in the ex-
isting model of co-operation in the area of spatial 
planning (the V4+Bulgaria and Romania format).
Establishing stronger bonds with the V4 could 
prove an attractive instrument for Zagreb in ce-
menting its bonds with its partners inside the 
EU and increasing its influence on European 
policy. What could further stimulate the en-
hancement of this co-operation is the fact that 
Croatia’s accession to the EU coincided with 
the beginning of Hungary’s presidency of the 
Visegrad Group (Hungary is the only V4 state 
to be Croatia’s direct neighbour). Hungary has 
declared its desire to enhance Central Europe-
an co-operation and gain the ‘synergy’ effect 
in connection with Hungary’s parallel presiden-
cy of the V4 (mid 2013 – mid 2014) and of the 
Central European Initiative (2013). Hungarian 
diplomatic activity in the first months of Croa-
tia’s presence in the EU will have a major impact 
on the development of regional co-operation, 
since this will be the period when Croatia’s po-
litical profile in the EU will crystallise.
APPENDIX
Croatia
Population 4.3 million
GDP per capita 10 295 euros
Economic growth -1.0%
Inflation 2.6%
Budget deficit -5.9% GDP
Public debt 59.7% GDP
Unemployment rate 16.7%
The latest data and forecasts for 2013. 
Source: National Bank of Croatia, www.hnb.hr/publikac/
bilten/arhiv/bilten-194/ebilt194.pdf
Accumulated value of Foreign Direct Investments 
(1993–2013/Q1)
country billions of euros
Austria 7.16
the Netherlands 4.08
Germany 3.12
Hungary 2.45
Luxembourg 1.73
France 1.39
Italy 1.30
Slovenia 1.14
Source: National Bank of Croatia, www.hnb.hr/statis-
tika/strana-ulaganja/e-inozemna-izravna-ulagan-
ja-u-rh-po-zemljama-porijekla.xls
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Exports millions of euros
Italy 1511
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1174
Germany 967
Slovenia 794
Austria 547
-
Hungary 241
Poland 103
the Czech Republic 94
Slovakia 89
V4 as a whole 527
Imports millions of euros
Italy 2676
Germany 2049
Russia 1185
China 1153
Slovenia 1012
-
Hungary 490
Poland 339
the Czech Republic 314
Slovakia 151
V4 as a whole 1294
Croatia’s key trade partners and the V4 states (2011)
Source: Croatian Statistical Office, www.dzs.hr/Hrv_Eng/ljetopis/2012/sljh2012.pdf
The research for this text was conducted during a fellowship at the Hungarian Institute of Interna-
tional Affairs (Magyar Külügyi Intézet - MKI) in June 2013 as part of the ‘V4 Flying Experts Initiative’ 
financed by the International Visegrad Fund
